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Security is an important concern in computer systems, which is especially remarkable when the system has
to handle large amounts of data and a number of different users accessing this data with different access-
ing permissions. Observing this demand, this work proposes an innovative approach to provide a security
infrastructure support to Big Data Analytic in Cloud-based systems named Fast-sec. Fast-Sec handles sys-
tems with large volumes of data from heterogeneous sources, in which users may access the system by
different platforms, consuming or providing data. The security infrastructure proposed in Fast-Sec provides
an authentication mechanism for users and data access control adapted to high demands from cloud-based
Big Data environment. The reported results show the adequacy of the proposed safety infrastructure to the
cloud-based systems processing Big Data.
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1. Introduction
Computer systems can collect and store data about different human interests and follow
its evolution almost on a continuous basis. Similarly, the environment (built and natural) is
ever more monitored by sensing devices that sample some aspects of the environment and
generate large volumes of data. This is a fact that pushes strong demands to data process-
ing and storage, particularly if real-time requirements have to be observed [1]. Observing
this reality, cloud computing is a promising technology to address the challenges imposed
by these new demands [2]. It already is an essential part of the global IT reality and it
has been used as a platform for business applications and data processing [3]. The current
challenge is how to construct such efficient processing infrastructures to handle massive
amounts of data, which is a great demand in the field of Big Data research and industry
communities.
Due to fact that this approach has specific characteristics which distinguish it from
other applications, such as, volume, variety, velocity, value and veracity [4] it demands
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new solutions. A large volume of data (volume) from different sources that ingress in the
cloud with different formats and sources (variety) are processed in real-time (velocity)
with high accuracy (veracity) to find competitive information (value) for society. However,
data need to be homogenized and coherently handled by the cloud or other infrastructures,
like hybrid infrastructures [5]. This infrastructure needs to be secured to guarantee the data
privacy and avoid miss usage of the services it offers.
The key vulnerabilities of such infrastructures are the constantly increasing openness
and scalability. The proposed solutions are focused mainly on achieving the basic Big
Data processing characteristics. The security requirements for such systems are not taken
into account and the solutions are not analyzed from the point of security [6]. The im-
portance of security increases rapidly with the growth of Big Data industry. The efficient
Big Data security infrastructure should include the following components: Authentica-
tion services; Access control infrastructure for the supported access policies; Encryption
protocols and other standard cryptography services; Fast on-the-fly auditing services [7].
Currently, there are several industrial approaches to securing the Big Data infrastruc-
tures on the market, such as: Cloudera Sentry, IBM InfoSphere Optim Data Masking,
Intel’s secure Hadoop distribution, Protegrity Big Data Protector for Hadoop, Revelytix
Loom,Zettaset Secure Data Warehouse, Apache Accumulo and other. All mentioned ap-
proaches are designed for the Hadoop infrastructure and utilize Kerberos secure resource
sharing protocol. In the theoretical field it is possible to mention some works related to
the concept of access control policy [8], hybrid environment machine-learning systems
[9] among other, but there are no general analytical articles related to Big Data security.
The existing approaches to securing the Big Data processing systems are designed and
implemented as patches, i.e., adjusted to the current needs of the system. The Big Data
security theory lacks the formal conceptual models of the consistently secure Big Data
processing systems, which obviously leads to the absence of the verifiable solutions for
security [10] and [11].
The top 10 security problems in the Big Data cloud processing are mentioned in the
CSA (Cloud security alliance) paper [12]. Fast-Sec presents a proposal to address one
of the most demanding of these problems, i.e., the problem of access control and which
is related to the user privacy protection. The proposal presents a novel approach to the
Big Data access control implementation. The methodology is based on the specific ac-
cess control methods designed for the Big Data processing incorporated into the cloud
infrastructure. The proposal includes a framework called Small & Medium sized Enter-
prise Data Analytic in Real Time (SMART) [13] and related access control methods that
support and protect the data analytic processes and associated access policy. SMART is a
modular framework for Big Data analysis that takes advantage of cloud, multiple clouds
or hybrid infrastructures to provide support for Small & Medium-sized services opera-
tion. The core access control framework has already been successfully implemented in
the protected cloud infrastructure. The complete solution provides a secure and flexible
cloud-based Big Data processing system capable to support the different types of services
that can be securely combined to address specific needs of different application domains
with different level of user access.
To describe the proposed Fast-Sec approach, its contributions and positioning in rela-
tion to related work, this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 examines the works
that are related with this proposal. In Section 3, there is an overview description of the
main characteristics of the proposed cloud infrastructure. Section 4.2 describes the pro-
posed authentication and access control mechanisms for this cloud infrastructure. Section
5 presents the acquired results for these proposed security mechanisms. Section 6 con-
cludes the paper and presents suggestions for future work.
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2. Related Work
The data of the organizations might involve both sensitive and non-sensitive information.
The computation of this profile should not be carried out in the public cloud without
a safe environment. Many users and businesses hesitate to keep confidential data in a
CSP because of data integrity and security problems, as described by Zhang [14]. The
study of Zhang entails conducting a secure search of distributed keywords across multiple
clouds. The aim is to provide a secure search service for encrypted cloud data. This ap-
proach has two schemes: the first scheme is a cross-store, i.e. all file slices, keywords and
keys are encrypted (this provides efficiency and anonymity for data owners). The second
scheme involves constructing a distribution strategy for both keyword and files (this sets
out the search and security requirements). These schemes are combined with Shamir’s
secret scheme to improve the distributed search system, where, all the files and keywords
for different CSPs are encrypted with different secret keys.
In the cross-store, each file is encrypted through an encryption key before it is dis-
tributed to N cloud servers or for some server in a particular CSP. The user has one
particular secret key Hs(kw,j) which will be used to encrypt a file segment, such
as Ci,j = (Fi,j)Hs(Kf,j). The file distribution is generated from random file slices
(Fi,1, Fi,2, . . . , Fi,N−1) with the same length. Each file Fi carries out an exclusive OR
operation ⊕ and Fi,N = Fi,1⊕Fi,2⊕ . . .⊕Fi,N−1⊕Fi. Then the secret keys (kf,j , kw,j)
and file slices (Fi,N ) are cross-stored among these CSPs. The authorized user retrieves the
file slices and the secret keys when he wants to access the data directly.
In the distribution strategy, a secret key is used to encrypt the files and a secret key ma-
trix shows the order of iterative encryption in the file slices. The file distribution is stored
in three stages: a) Each file is encrypted and partitioned into N file slices. b) The system
creates an iterative encryption matrix M with the file slices that are stored with the user.
c) The encrypted file is distributed over CSPs without the providers knowing the secret
matrix. When an authorized user wants to execute a security search, he issues a trapdoor
to CSPs to retrieve the encrypted file slices. Following this, these file slices are decrypted
and the original file is reconstructed. The trapdoor is an encrypted keyword without previ-
ous information from the destination. The computational complexity is O((N !)T ), where
N is the number of CSPs and T is the number of iterative encryption rounds.
Hybrid clouds uses local resources to process a determined number of workloads. When
these resources dry up in a “have-tail consume”, more availability is needed in a public
cloud, and issues like security and privacy become a problem, as shown in the study of
[15]. A safe computational approach to hybrid cloud is to separate sensitive from non-
sensitive data. The authors introduce a framework to MapReduce for secure computing
with mixed-sensitivity data in hybrid cloud called Tagged-MapReduce. The data receives
sensitive or non-sensitive flags and the key/value pair has an equivalent tag.
The goal is to prevent sensitive data from leaving private cloud. The programmers can
decide where the computation will be executed. As a result, the input data and the inter-
mediate keys can be moved from a private cloud to a public cloud without compromising
security. The Map and Reduce phases produce {key/value; tag} pairs when a sensitive
input data is received. The scheduling of both HDFS and Jobtracker will identify the tag.
The function of the tag is to indicate the execution path for the system. The scheduler em-
ploys all the intermediate results for private cloud to carry out the reduction, even though
the intermediate transfers might overload the private servers and generate a high volume
of data from clouds (whether public or private).
The Cloud Security Alliance report [12] describes the most important problems of se-
curing the distributed data processing systems. Among them it is possible to highlight:
mapper security, real-time monitoring, end-point security, middleware protection, user
privacy protection and access control. Traditional and conventional security mechanisms
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are not suitable to be direct applied to the emerging distributed services present in current
cloud-based systems, and adapting them to this new context is a very challenging task.
The critical components, such as access control, remain elusive [16], [17].
In line with the above highlighted aspect, it is possible to take Hadoop-oriented se-
curity approaches based on the Kerberos resource sharing protocol [18], which turn out
to be ineffective in relation to support and implementation [17], [16]. Besides that, it is
difficult, and rather time-consuming, to set up and configure the Kerberos infrastructure
[16]. In cloud computing systems, it is preferable to use either public-key infrastructure
(PKI) or Attribute-based Encryption (ABE) for protecting the user privacy [19], while the
symmetric encryption should be used to support the fast processing of the bulk data [20].
Scrutinizing the literature, it is possible to observe that apart from the Hadoop security
infrastructure based on Kerberos, there is a wide demand for developing security models
and policies in for the cloud domain [16], [21], [22], [7]. Such models allow to analyze the
consistency of a proposed security architecture, and figure out the basic adversary model
[21]. Other can be applied for distributed data processing infrastructures, such as Flink,
possessing more flexibility in providing various data processing functions [5].
According to the CSA report [12], the most promising cryptographic tool for security
framework implementation is the Attribute-based Encryption (ABE) [23], [24], [25]. The
most important challenge related to ABE implementation is the necessity to apply modi-
fications in order to support the key revocation [26] and simplify the key generation [19].
In light of these problems, this current paper reports the work to provide a security
model corresponding to the attribute-based access model, with a corresponding imple-
mentation design to support the model. The goal is not only to propose the model as in
related work, [16], [21], [22], but also to provide a practical ABE-based framework design
and implementation.
3. Cloud infrastructure
This Section shows the main features and an overview of the infrastructure behind from
safety approach of Smart-Sec described in the Section 4.2. The infrastructure proposed
is the core to the environment in the Cloud with different devices following an attribute
access-based policy. Thus, it is a Big Data processing services in the SMART cloud-based
architecture.
3.1 Architecture Overview
Different cloud infrastructures have their own configuration parameters, and the availabil-
ity and performance of offered resources can change dynamically according to several
factors, including the degree of over-commitment that a provider employs. In this con-
text, solutions are needed for the automatic configuration of complex cloud services at
several abstraction levels. Cloud infrastructures comprising heterogeneous hardware en-
vironments may need the specification of configuration parameters at several levels such
as the operational system, service containers and network capabilities [27]. As users need
to execute applications may not know how to map their requirements to available re-
sources, this lack of knowledge about the cloud provider infrastructure will lead either to
overestimation or underestimation; both are equally bad as the former leads to waste of
resources whereas the second sacrifices quality of service.
The application profile is optimized for all file sizes in the available infrastructure. As
the systems are independent different data sizes can be manipulated at same time. Previ-
ous work has been performed on MapReduce for hybrid environments [5], [28]. Figure
1 illustrates the solution proposed to model a hybrid system which depicts a Global Dis-
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patcher and Global Aggregator to be used on the infrastructure.
Figure 1. SMART Architecture
The Global Dispatcher located outside the cloud has middleware functions for handling
task assignment, and management of user-provided data. It is a centralized data storage
system that manages policies for split data and distribution in accordance with the needs
of each system. The working principle is similar to a publish/subscribe service (PS-S) in
which the system obtains data and publishes computing results [5]. PS-S is a mechanism
producer/consumer that works like a Queue Message. The user defines tasks and local data
for put in a queue over Apache Kafka in similar manner to [29] and after the scheduler
from global dispatcher distributes this tasks in the queue for machines in the Cloud. The
Global Aggregator data output from both systems and merges them in order to obtain the
final data set.
3.2 SMART Internal Infrastructure Components
Hybrid infrastructure, where there are many cloud providers with heterogeneous envi-
ronments and configurations, often needs to use an orchestrator to manage the results
and data input from users. The orchestrator must be decentralized in order to improve
data distribution in the network. The infrastructure enables the use of highly heteroge-
neous machines. When considering the use of a public cloud to extend the capacity of a
community cloud, or desktop grid, several scenarios and data strategies are possible. The
extent to which a set of data-distribution strategies is applicable to a given scenario de-
pends on how much bandwidth is available. Two distinct Distributed File System (DFS)
implementations may be required to handle data distribution in two scenarios, namely
low-bandwidth and high-bandwidth. The Apache Flink, formerly known as Stratosphere
[30], is the base infrastructure of the SMART framework system, represented in Figure 2.
Its flexible pipeline enables several MapReduce and extended functions like Map, Map-
Partion, Reduce, Aggregate, Join and Iterative. It can be used in order to allow this cloud
extension. The setting will be transparent to users because a middleware in a top level ab-
stracts the complexity away from the users. The different layers of the stack build on top
of each other and raise the abstraction level of the program representations they accept:
• The API layer implements multiple APIs that create operator DAGs for their programs.
Each API needs to provide utilities (serializers, comparators) that describe the interac-
tion between its data types and the runtime. All programming APIs are translated to an
intermediate program representation that is compiled and optimized via a cost-based
optimizer.
• The Flink Common API and Optimizer layer takes programs in the form of operator
DAGs. The operators are specific (e.g., Map, Join, Filter, Reduce, FlatMap, MapParti-
tion, ReduceGroup, Aggregate, Union, Cross, etc) and the data is in nonuniform type.
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The concrete types and their interaction with the runtime are specified by the higher
layers.
• The Flink Runtime layer receives a program in the form of a JobGraph. A JobGraph is
a generic parallel data flow with arbitrary tasks that consume and produce data streams.
The runtime is designed to perform very well both in setups with abundant memory and
in setups where memory is scarce.
Figure 2. Apache Flink component stack
Flink explores the power of massively parallel computing for advanced analytics and
leverages a novel, database inspired approach to analyze, aggregate, and query very large
collections of either textual or (semi-)structured data on a virtualized, massively parallel
cluster architecture. It combines the strengths of MapReduce/Hadoop with powerful pro-
gramming abstractions in Java and Scala and a high performance runtime. In addition to
basic data flow concepts as common in relational databases, or systems like Hadoop and
Spark, Flink has native support for iterations, incremental iterations, and programs con-
sisting of large DAGs (Directed Acyclic Graph) of operations. Particularly, it is possible
to highlight the following:
• Flink uses a richer set of primitives than MapReduce, including primitives that allow the
easy specification, automatic optimization, and efficient execution of joins. This makes
the system a more attractive compilation platform for data warehousing, information
extraction, information integration, and many other applications. The programmer does
not need to worry about writing parallel code or hand-picking a join order.
• Flink includes native support rather than outside loop in Mahout [31] on top of Hadoop
for iterative programs that make repeated passes over a data set updating a model until
they converge to a solution. Flink contains explicit “iterate” operators including bulk
iteration and delta iteration that enable very efficient loops over data sets, e.g., for ma-
chine learning and graph applications. These operators enable the specification, opti-
mization, and execution of graph analytic and statistical applications inside the data
processing engine.
• Different from Spark, Flink uses an execution engine that includes external memory
query processing algorithms and natively supports arbitrarily long programs shaped as
DAG. Flink offers both pipeline (inter-operator) and data (intra-operator) parallelism.
Flink’s runtime is designed as a data processing pipeline engine rather than a batch
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processing engine, thus it supports both batch and streaming processing. Operators do
not wait for their predecessors to finish in order starting processing data. This results in
a very efficient handling of large data sets.
4. The Proposed Fast-Sec Security Model
The proposed approach to secure Big Data systems on the cloud is an evolution of a cloud-
based access control and privacy protection infrastructure which is currently implemented
in protected enterprise cloud storage - Storgrid [32]. This infrastructure is the core of the
protected environment in the cloud with the heterogeneous devices and attribute access
policy. Therefore, it is suitable for the SMART cloud-based architecture and correspond-
ing Big Data processing services. The proposed security model tackles authentication and
access control problems with a modular and light-weight approach that will be have its
components first detailed and then explained how it is integrated in the SMART.
4.1 Authentication and Access Control Mechanisms
In order to address the issues related to authentication and access control, the proposed
approach consists in an infrastructure including the following components: Encryption
server; File storage; Key storage; and Client UI. These elements are illustrated in Figure
3 and detailed in the following.
Figure 3. Security Infrastructure Components
Encryption server manages all the certified authentication (CA) and encryption opera-
tions and grants the user access to the data storage. This server can store the encryption
keys and/or connect to a separate Key Storage server.
File storage is secure in the sense that some of the files specified by the domain ad-
ministrator are store, encrypted and have restricted access. Due to the fact that the file
storage data is partially stored in the cloud, i.e., externally it is recommended to encrypt
this external part of file storage completely.
Client UI can connect to the Encryption server and ask for the permission to access the
file storage in order to view/edit/upload specific files or folders.
All components of the proposed system support the high-level cryptographic functions,
including different types of encryption, timestamp verification and hashing. In order to
increase efficiency, a hybrid encryption system is set up which is combined of both sym-
metric and attribute-based encryption. This configuration allows controlling the privacy of
the users without compromising the overall encryption time. In addition, the basic ABE
[23], [24] approach was modified to improve configuration parameters and increase the
speed of encryption, for the purpose of set up the validation period from user key and
more sophisticated attributes corresponding to both the file shares and user groups. Nev-
ertheless, the detailed description of ABE encryption modification is out of the scope of
this article. The basic functionality of the security components are briefly described in the
following:
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File storage: The bulk data in the protected file storage is encrypted with the appro-
priate block cypher (AES, Blowfish, IDEA, Serpent). The key to the encrypted data is
stored in the key storage and has expiry period in order to increase the protection. Once
the portion of data is sent to the client, it is decrypted by the server and re-encrypted with
another unique user session key.
Key storage: The symmetric keys for the data in the file storage are kept in the separate
storage. The protection of the key storage is implemented via some strong authentication
method, i.e., two-factor authentication. Additionally, in order to increase the security of
the sensitive data we propose the following methods:
a. Set up the key expiry period;
b. Use separate key for the different files;
c. Use secret sharing mechanism to key storing with the most sensitive data.
Encryption server: The most important cryptography services are run on the Encryp-
tion server. This server generates the user keys and connects to the client UI, i.e., a separate
user of the system and decides whether the access to the specific dataset should be granted
to this user. In addition, the server runs the key renewal routines, stores the user public
keys and attributes besides the auditing data.
Client UI: The client UI connects to the encryption server and checks the expiry pe-
riod of the user keys (in the case it has been configured) and permits the device user to
view/edit/upload the data. Client UI stores the user keys for the ABE encryption and the
unique symmetric session keys which serve for restricting the access to the downloaded
files. The symmetric keys are encrypted with the ABE keys. The client allows the whole
system to work in the heterogeneous environment as it supports different platforms and
operating systems.
The described modular infrastructure allows setting up different components separately
and configuring the security system according to specific needs. The integration of the
security infrastructure into the Big Data environment is possible due to its flexibility and
scalable architecture. The main purpose of the proposed security infrastructure is the setup
of the access control in the cloud-based protected environment. The access control mech-
anism performs tasks as follows:
(1) Authentication of users in the cloud system: The initial authentication is per-
formed by user password and email id. In order to increase the security hier-
archical system of authentication to the highly sensitive data is implemented a
more sophisticated two-factor authentication, apart from the password and access
to e-mail, the possession of a specific device is verified too. This can be used in
the government services or services with the highly sensitive data.
(2) Provision of access control functions and protection of data from the unauthorized
access: once the user is authenticated he/she can get access to the functions of the
storage in order to upload or to download the data. The CA services are run by the
encryption server. The server generates and distributes the user keys and keeps the
group attributes along with the file sharing ids. Access control allows to securely
distribute and show to the user (or accept from user) only the data he is permitted
to view/edit. In order to achieve this protection, a special version of ABE is used
with the implementation of both possible policies: key policy – KP, and cyphertext
policy – CP, in order to support the attributes of the groups of users as well as the
attributes of the file shares. This algorithm is developed specifically for the access
structure of the proposed cloud architecture.
(3) Protection of of the user data privacy: Once the user wishes to access a separate
file downloaded on user device the client uses his/her ABE key after performing
the authentication in order to decrypt the symmetric session key and open the file.
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4.2 Security Model Details
The proposed approach to secure the distributed data processing on the cloud is an ex-
tension of a cloud-based access control and privacy protection infrastructure. The core of
the protected environment in the cloud is the hybrid attribute-based encryption [19] with
additional parameters which allow to support the protection of heterogeneous devices and
attribute access policy avoiding the immense use/optimizing the use of computational
resources. Therefore, it is suitable for the SMART cloud-based architecture and corre-
sponding Big Data processing services.
A simpler method of securing the user-generated data is used for the services the require
the rapid data processing. In other words, the Storgrid security framework is extended with
the following infrastructure:
Figure 4. Smart Secure method
The protection of the services in such system is is based on the two basic mechanisms:
1) digital signature i.e. no one should be able to modify the data entered by a specific user
other than the user himself and 2) the selective cryptography i.e. only the specific pieces
of information collected are encrypted in order to improve the quality of sort and search
service operations.
In order to protect the privacy and provide security for the enterprise services the initial
Storgrid hybrid attribute-based AC is used. In this case, the performance is compromised
for the sake of better security.
The proposed approach is based on several cryptographic mechanisms. The files/bulk
data/multimedia are encrypted with 128/256-bit AES, while the permanent file keys are
encrypted with the attribute-based encryption. The set of expiring ABE keys correspond-
ing to the set of files accessible by user in encrypted with a single expiring AES key (KEY
SET KEY). This key is split by server into 4 parts (2 are stored on the device and 2 belong
to the user) by the secret sharing scheme (SSS). The encryption workflow is outlined in
the following Figure 5.
With each user session, the permanent FILE KEY (unique AES key) is re-encrypted.
The set of FILE KEYs is protected with the corresponding ABE keys. The unique ABE
model supports the attribute policy based on user groups and on file shares. The model
supports the simple selective ABE scheme [28], [29]. The selective scheme for attribute-
based encryption is as follows: if at least one attribute in the set {ti}U is equal to the
attribute in the set {ti}M , the corresponding user U can decrypt the text M . In other
words, as soon as the user and share have one attribute in common - the user can get
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Figure 5. Encryption workflow
access to the share. The components of the ABE encryption are:
• Master-key (MK) which is kept safely on server and accessible only for the domain
administrator and is specified by MK = (t1, t2, ..., tn, y), where the values ti are ran-
domly selected from the group Zp. They are the private keys corresponding to the group
attributes. Note, that this is different from the usual PK encryption: the private keys are
controlled by the admin and not by the users;
• Public key (PK) depends on the master key values and is kept in the clear allowing
users to access the information: PK = (gt1 , gt2 , ..., gtn , .., e(g, g)y), Here e(g, g) is the
bilinear pairing function corresponding to an elliptic curve;
• Secret user KEY SET depends on his attribute set. Here each Di (GROUP KEY) serves
for decryption of the data of a single group of users, for example, related to some
project: {ti}U → D = {Di = gyw/ti};
• Encrypted text M , in our context, M = FILE KEY, or the permanent AES symmetric
key, which allows to avoid the file re-encryption.
Encryption procedure is multiplication. The set of the public keys Ei (PUBLIC
SHARE KEY) corresponding to the set of groups able to access the text is kept along
with the encrypted text E:
E = Me(g, g)ys, {Ei = gtis/w}, i ∈ {ti}M
Decryption is division: M = E/Y s
In order to perform this operation the user needs the pair of private key Di and public
key Ei corresponding to the attribute ti :
Y s = e(g, g)ys = e(Ei, Di) = e(g
yw/ti , gtis/w) = e(g, g)ys
The result of decryption is the FILE KEY - the symmetric AES key that permits to
decrypt the contents of protected file.
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4.3 Security Infrastructure of the SMART Cloud-Based Processing Service
In order to combine the SMART architecture and the proposed hybrid CA system it is
necessary to separate the functions of the encryption server, i.e., the protection services
that work once the data is uploaded (authentication, CA, encryption) which must run be-
fore the data is sent to the Global Aggregator, from the protection services that work when
the data is downloaded, which must be set up after the data passes the Global Dispatcher
(CA, decryption, key refreshment). The encrypted cloud storage is also separated. The
whole ecosystem is shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6. Components of the security infrastructure and their interactions
This integration model makes it possible to implement the required level of security
and user privacy in all types of governmental and corporation organizations and services
(like medical or governmental services) using the SMART infrastructure. The modular
implementation design allows protecting the user privacy and control the access to the
sensitive data in the heterogeneous environment via the Client UI developed for various
OS and various platforms. The security is globally supervised with the help of the Encryp-
tion server and separate key storage. Additionally, this architecture can be easily extended
in order to use more sophisticated methods of ensuring the data and key protection, i.e.,
secret sharing or complex attribute policies.
5. Implementation and Results
The proposed Fast-Sec security infrastructure is currently implemented as part of the Stor-
grid project [32]. Storgrid is a secure cloud storage management system which allows
controlling the level of data security and user privacy for a particular organization. The
basic security components, i.e., server UI, client UI and protected file storage have suc-
cessfully passed the testing phase. The results and analysis from this testing phase are
here presented. The tests are focused in evaluating the efficiency in attributing security
levels to protected and public files. The administrator (or domain manager) controls this
process in the server accessing it through a secret password. His/her responsibility is to
decide the level of security of the protected/public files and define an authorization policy
on a web interface shown in Figure 7.
The basic encryption method on the server side is 128 bit AES, which is a well-tested
method that provides a fast encryption of the big bulks of data [20]. In order to enhance
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Figure 7. Storgrid web UI
the security, the file storage secret key has expiry period (e.g. one day), which forces a
new re-encryption of the whole storage. However, in order to not negatively affect the
system performance, the procedure of key regeneration and re-encryption runs when the
system is idle or has low activity. The key expiry period makes the whole system more
secure, due to the fact that hackers can hardly steal the key and the encrypted files within
one attack. Moreover, auditing and log analysis performed on the server side do not allow
a successful attack within one day.
The results of the re-encryption tests taken from the server real-time log in the above
described scenario are shown in Table 1. The acquired results demonstrate that the average
encryption time is rather low, even for the big bulk of data, considering the size of the data
collected by the SMART services. The encryption time depends on the server load at the
time when encryption has been performed. The results demonstrate a low overhead to the
protected file re-encryption in local file system. Therefore, this re-encryption mechanism
is suitable to be successfully integrated into the existing SMART infrastructure with the
purpose of enhancing the security of Big Data storage.
Another reason to use re-encryption is that Fast-Sec does not use the concept of com-
plete data encryption. Instead, it performs a selective encryption of the sensitive user data
in order to avoid overhead that would occur if the encryption was performed over all
the data. To perform this selective encryption, a given number of files, or fields in the
database, are not encrypted while others are encrypted and sent over the insecure network
(in the cloud). This concept avoids network overload and allows controlling the security
of the files. The control of this process is performed by the domain manager access control
utility.
Table 1. Re-encryption time results
Server Log Files Number Duration (ms)
srv.log 2015-09-18 18:06:28; [id = 1003;] 16,304 324.345
srv.log 2015-09-18 18:06:28; [id = 1004;] 35,834 162.629
srv.log 2015-09-18 18:07:23; [id = 1005;] 21,501 124.399
srv.log 2015-09-18 18:12:32; [id = 1006;] 23,651 149.948
srv.log 2015-09-18 18:40:00; [id = 1007;] 28,614 523.232
srv.log 2015-09-18 18:40:00; [id = 1008;] 49,494 397.334
srv.log 2015-09-18 18:55:02; [id = 1008;] 41,751 533.838
srv.log 2015-09-18 19:01:38; [id = 1010;] 45,360 368.900
By its turn, the client controls security from the user side and in the cloud. This con-
trol is implemented on different platforms, according to the specific control that is under
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concern. The proposal supports the concept of light-weighted client, i.e., it the client side
is not responsible for executing much encryption or other critical/heavy operations. All
encryption-heavy operations are performed on the server side, while the client just sup-
ports the key usage.
It is important to highlight that a unique feature provided by the proposed Fast-Sec
is that when the encrypted files are not downloaded again, the keys remain the same.
This allows the user manipulate his/her downloaded files after authentication with the
password and user ID (his/her email), and the files are kept securely in his/her storage
device (encrypted with the unique AES key). The access to the AES key is controlled
by the server, following an ABE encryption and the above explained key expiry period.
The operation of regenerating the public keys and resending them to users are not time-
consuming due to the implementation design. This statement is supported by the results
of tests in which the user key generation procedure for 1000 user logins and 1000 key
samples out of 20 parallel threads, which are presented in Table 2.
Table 2. User key generation procedure results
User numbers Average Min Max KB/s Avg. Bytes
30 0.82 38.4 35.7 154 320
60 0.67 42.1 34.7 138 340
120 0.52 45.1 34.0 124 370
Analyzing the results presented above, it is possible to state that the proposed Fast-Sec
security infrastructure is light-weighted and designed to reduce the network load without
compromising the level of user security. These are desirable properties for cloud-based
systems that have to process huge amounts of data of different users and that possibly
need to meet (near) real time requirements. Observing the context of SMART architecture
and its intended usage, discussed in 1, the proposed Fast-Sec approach perfectly matches
it’s security needs without incurring in prohibitive overhead.
6. Conclusion
This paper reports the proposal of Fast-Sec, a security infrastructure solution for Cloud-
based Big Data Analysis systems. The goal of the proposal is to address the security
needs of cloud-based systems that handle massive amounts of data in real time analysis
provided by heterogeneous data sources. This context is presented within a cloud-based
architecture called SMART, which presents all featured characteristics of such emerging
cloud-based systems. Fast-sec provides authentication and access control mechanisms
appropriate to deal with the high demands of the applications intended to be supported
by SMART architecture. The proposed infrastructure was designed and implemented to
meet strict performance requirements, avoiding overloading the system with prohibitive
overhead due to its security mechanisms. The performed tests provide evidence that the
integration of the security infrastructure into the SMART architecture imposes low over-
head without compromising the security level of the handled data, thus presenting itself
as suitable for SMART and other similar cloud-based architectures.
Future works are planned to fully integrate the proposed security infrastructure in the
SMART architecture. Additional load tests are to be performed in order to assess its scal-
ability under a variety of system usage profiles, i.e., under different demands of the real
time Big Data analysis and varying types of data sources, besides those already tested and
reported so far. Moreover, additional mechanisms can be incorporated to the infrastruc-
ture, such as data anonymization, which is very useful for different emerging cloud-based
applications.
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